Discussion on Poverty and The WTO: Impacts of the Doha Development Agenda
01 Feb '06
10 min read
7. Negotiations and agreements do not occur in a policy vacuum. The Zambia case shows that other policy decisions can be crucial. Since privatisation of one marketing board in 1994, cotton production in Zambia has shifted strongly towards poorer farmers so that any world price rise arising form the DDA will now be more strongly pro-poor than it would have been before (see slide 13).
8. The case study of Brazil shows that the assertion by European negotiators that all the benefits of trade liberalisation go to rich landowners is not entirely true. The figures presented on slide 19 show that, although the richest decile of agricultural employers could see an 8.2% increase in income, the poorest decile of non-agricultural workers could benefit from an 8.5% increase income. This is the result of increased jobs in agriculture going to the previously unemployed.
9. Conclusions
i. The DDA round must be ambitious to have an impact on development. Winters makes a criticism that DDA should have focused on tariffs, rather than export subsidies, as tariffs have more impact on poverty.
ii. The DDA says little on developing countries' own liberalisation (i.e. tariff cuts), which Winters explains would have the most impact on poverty.
iii. He also concluded from his comparison of full liberalisation and DDA liberalisation that DDA is less development friendly than full liberalisation.
Sheila Page raised 3 main points:
1. There isa danger that the impact trade can have on development is being overemphasised. The World Bank itself lowered its estimates of the impact trade can have during each of the Uruguay and Doha rounds. Hopes should not be raised in vain.